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**KRAJOWA MAPA ZAGROŻEŃ BEZPIECZEŃSTWA W POLSCE -
ASPEKTY PRAKTYCZNE W PERSPEKTYWIE
KRYMINOLOGICZNEJ**

**THE NATIONAL SECURITY THREAT MAP IN POLAND -
PRACTICAL ASPECTS IN A CRIMINOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE**

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Streszczenie

Obrazowanie przestępczości, czy też nanoszenie na mapę zdarzeń niepożądanych nie jest nowym sposobem na walkę z przestępczością. Wciąż bowiem funkcjonariusze korzystają ze starych, sprawdzonych narzędzi, które umożliwiają im geograficzne przedstawienie zarówno przestępstw, jak i wykroczeń. W ten sposób możliwe jest zidentyfikowanie obszarów zagrożonych, a także pozyskanie informacji mających na celu obranie odpowiedniej strategii działań na poczet dyslokacji służb patrolowych. Wraz z rozwojem technologii, także i w tym przypadku podstawowe narzędzia zostały częściowo zastąpione przez nowoczesne oprogramowanie, interaktywnym odpowiednikiem pinezek i kolorowych samoprzylepnych karteczek z notatkami nanoszonych na mapę jest Krajowa Mapa Zagrożeń Bezpieczeństwa w Polsce (dalej: KMZB).

Celem niniejszego artykułu pozostaje przedstawienie przedmiotowego zagadnienia pod kątem możliwości jego praktycznego zastosowania, co zostało poprzedzone stosownymi rozważaniami, zarówno w oparciu o własne badania naukowe jak i w perspektywie zmian, jakie zostały dokonane na przestrzeni kilku kolejnych lat (od 2016 r.). Zagadnienie pozostaje bowiem wciąż aktualne w kontekście poszukiwania nowych form przeciwdziałania przestępczości i z pewnością powinno podążać za zmianami technicznymi, które stale ewoluują.

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Wykorzystując analizę piśmiennictwa i dostępnych źródeł internetowych, w tym przeprowadzając analizę aktów prawnych, aplikacji KMZB, także poprzez obszerne badania materiałów pozyskanych z Komendy Głównej Policji, Komendy Stołecznej Policji oraz komend Wojewódzkich Policji skupiono się na szczegółowym ujęciu przedmiotowego zagadnienia. Działania te doprowadziły do jednoznacznego rozróżnienia w zakresie map zagrożeń – wewnętrznych, tajnych dokumentów Policji (tzw. ceduły patrolowe) oraz KMZB – narzędzia dostępnego za pomocą sieci Internet dla całego społeczeństwa. Pokłosiem podjętego wysiłku badawczego pozostaje wskazanie wniosków i postulatów, które mogą w przyszłości przyczynić się do weryfikacji skuteczności narzędzia przez ich pomysłodawców, jak i do jego modyfikacji o nowe komponenty bądź wyeliminowania stwierdzonych nieprawidłowości. Nie bez znaczenia pozostaje także ewaluacja dotychczas wypracowanych wytycznych dla funkcjonariuszy i podjęte rozważania dotyczące ewentualnych nowelizacji podstaw prawnych leżących tworzących KMZB. Wszystkie te działania ostatecznie mają szansę przyczynić się do dalszych prac nad dostosowaniem ustawodawstwa krajowego, stanowiącego na rzecz poprawy stanu bezpieczeństwa w lokalnych społecznościach, do zmieniających się warunków z jednoczesnym zastosowaniem nowoczesnych metod i narzędzi interaktywnych.

Słowa kluczowe: Krajowa Mapa Zagrożeń Bezpieczeństwa, mapa zagrożeń, mapowanie przestępczości

Abstract

Crime mapping, or putting undesirable events on a map, is not a new way to fight crime.

The officers still use old, proven tools that enable them to present both crimes and offenses geographically. In this way, it is possible to identify areas at risk, as well as obtain information aimed at selecting an appropriate strategy of activities for the dislocation of patrol services.

With the advancement of technology, also in this case the basic tools have been partially replaced by modern software. An interactive equivalent of pushpins and coloured sticky notes with comments put on a map is the National Map of Security Threats in Poland [Krajowa Mapa Zagrożeń Bezpieczeństwa] (hereinafter referred to as KMZB).

The purpose of this paper is to present a detailed analysis of the issue in question, with particular emphasis on the possibility of its practical application. It has been preceded by relevant considerations, both on the basis of our own research and in the perspective of the changes that have been made over several consecutive years (since 2016). The issue remains valid in the context of searching for new forms of crime prevention, and it should certainly follow the ongoing technical developments as technology is constantly evolving.

Using an analysis of the literature and available internet sources, including an analysis of legal acts and the KMZB application, as well as through extensive research of materials obtained from the National Police Headquarters, the Warsaw

Police Headquarters and the Provincial Police Headquarters, we focused on a comprehensive presentation of the issue in question. These activities have led to a clear distinction in terms of threat maps – internal, secret police documents (so-called patrol assignments) and the KMZB – an online tool available to the entire public. The result of the research effort undertaken is the identification of conclusions and postulates, which may in the future contribute to the verification of the effectiveness of the tool by its originators, as well as to its modification with new components or elimination of identified irregularities. It is also important to evaluate the guidelines for officers developed so far and to consider possible amendments to the legal basis underlying the KMZB. All these activities ultimately have the potential to contribute to further development of national legislation aimed at improving public safety in local communities so that the law is adapted to the changing environment while making use of modern interactive methods and tools.

Keywords: National Security Threat Map, threat map, crime mapping

Introduction

Considering the fact that states continue to evolve, and the societies that make them up are in constant flux, the concern for the security of citizens living in a particular territory remains quite a significant one. In this context, it remains extremely important to identify any risks, and then further categorise them to adopt appropriate action strategies. Thus, human behaviour demonstrated in a specific geographical area has become the subject of analysis, for which maps have been created to provide information on the territorial distribution of human activity.

A tool for illustrating undesirable developments (crimes, offences) is security threat maps, which over the years have taken various forms. Initially, they focused on reflecting social problems such as unemployment or poverty, which also affected the incidence and distribution of crime.² This aspect is particularly evident in environmental criminology, whose basic assumptions include the aforementioned maps as well as the zoning of cities,³ the consequence of which is the transformation of the social environment as a result of ongoing developments.⁴

² Doniosłe znaczenie miała publikacja twórcy ekologii społecznej Roberta Ezry Parka: *The city: Suggestions for the investigation of human behavior in the city environment*, "The American Journal of Sociology" XX (5), March 1915, s. 577-612, <https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/212433> (dostęp: 28.06.2021).

³ W 1925 r. E.W. Burgess, R.E. Park i R.D. McKenzie wskazali, że miasto można podzielić na 5 stref: centralną, przejściową, mieszkań pracowniczych, willową i podmiejską. Każda z nich pełniła określoną rolę, a jednocześnie rozszerzała swoje granice, co ostatecznie powodowało, z jednej strony, napieranie na siebie stref, z drugiej zaś, rozpoczynało proces zmiany granic. Taka reorganizacja skutkowała dezorganizacją uprzedniego porządku wewnętrznego. Pokłosiem tych zmian nie mogło pozostać nic innego jak naruszenie dotychczas obowiązujących zasad społecznych, a stąd już tylko krok od rozwoju zjawisk niepożądanych.

⁴ Więcej o znaczeniu koncepcji kryminologicznych, w tym w szczególności kryminologii środowiskowej

Changes in the incidence of crime and the need for analysis, including for the purpose of the adoption of assumptions regarding certain patterns, have over time made maps a useful police tool. At the same time, however, not every one of them has served and continues to serve the same role, even though the basic premise is to manage public safety in a way that allows to prevent crime and implement preventive measures for the future.

In this context attention should be drawn to Regulation No. 768 of the Police Commander-in-Chief of 14 August 2007 on forms and methods of tasks execution for the Police officers on patrol duty and on coordination of preventive activities (hereinafter: Regulation No. 768),⁵ which regulates the most important issues concerning the analyses of the state of public safety and order for the purposes of the dislocation of patrol service. In Chapter 1 § 2 the Directive presents a catalogue of terms such as 'risk area', 'location at risk' or 'area of responsibility'. Each term refers to geographically separated areas that are patrolled by police officers. In addition to the primary objective of preventing crimes and offences, these activities should be based on the principles of what is known internationally as *community policing* or *neighbourhood policing*⁶, as reflected in § 4(1)(4), i.e. "establishing and maintaining links with the local community in order to create a sense of security and a shared responsibility for preventing threats (...)". Also of significance is the provision of § 7(1), which among the tasks of the police officer in charge of preparing the analysis of the state of security includes the need to "make use of information provided from the units carrying out operational and exploratory activities and from the heads of the units of the preventive service, as well as from other sources, including the mass media, local authorities and the local community and non-police entities".

In order to effectively manage data obtained in this way, threat maps are created, and the responsibility for their operation rests with the deputy commanders responsible for supervising preventive services at provincial, district and capital city police headquarters.⁷ This allows for an in-depth analysis of the situation regarding law and order, which is mainly based on the assessment and monitoring of the factors affecting that situation.⁸

1. Shaping of safe and secure environments

w kontekście zapobiegania przestępczości, zob. M. Bieniek-Ciarcińska, *Profilaktyka kryminalno-architektoniczna*, „Probacja” 2021, nr 4, s. 87-114.

⁵ Dz. Urz. KGP z 2007 r. Nr 15, poz. 119, ze zm.

⁶ Ang. koncepcja policji środowiskowej.

⁷ § 9 zarządzenia nr 768 Komendanta Głównego Policji z dnia 14 sierpnia 2007 r. w sprawie metod i form wykonywania zadań przez policjantów pełniących służbę patrolową oraz koordynacji działań o charakterze prewencyjnym (Dz. Urz. KGP Nr 15, poz. 119, ze zm.)

⁸ Takie działania nie powinny mieć miejsca rzadziej niż raz w miesiącu o czym wprost stanowi § 15 pkt 3.

Cognitive maps (also known as mental maps, spatial maps or named as a process called cognitive mapping) gained their popularity in the 1970s, even though a decade earlier geographers Kevin Lynch and Peter Gould had undertaken the first research in this area. In Poland, we should pay attention to the concepts of “perceptual geography” and “cities of memory”, which were first used by Hanna Libura in her study of people’s behaviour and attitudes within the space they inhabited in the town of Sanok.⁹ In a similar context, operates also behavioural geography, which aims to explain human behaviour in the space around them and the related phenomena and social processes taking place. This science does not merely undertake theoretical considerations, but also has practical value. It is used, for example, in cases of natural disasters to determine the likely behaviour of the population in the affected areas (their choices under conditions of uncertainty, their social attitudes), which should also have the effect of limiting potential losses.¹⁰

Over time, a new method, psychocartography, was also identified, with the specific aim of measuring the psychological properties of a given space. In the case of Warsaw, a map relating to this direction has been created. Its characteristic feature was the application of colours depicting the intensity of certain phenomena related to the intensity of feelings expressed by the respondents taking part in the survey. Accordingly, Warsaw was divided into two areas: the left-bank part of the capital was marked in red as the more ‘liked’ area, while the right-bank part was marked in blue, symbolising the areas about which respondents did not express positive feelings.¹¹

Moving on to the existing domestic conditions, in particular the issue of crime prevention, it should be pointed out that in the course of the research analyses,¹² carried out from 2016 onwards, a distinction was made between the threat maps in Poland in the form of patrol assignments which remain internal police documents and the National Security Threat Map in Poland, to which the further part of this paper is devoted.

1.1. Patrol assignments

The role and form of patrol assignments was regulated in the already mentioned

⁹ H. Libura, *Badanie wyobrażeń geograficznych na przykładzie mieszkańców Sanoka*, „Dokumentacja Geograficzna” 1988, z. 1, na uwagę zasługują także inne publikacje m.in. M. Bartnicka, *Wyobrażenia przestrzeni miejskiej Warszawy (studium geografii percepcji)*, „Dokumentacja Geograficzna” 1989, z. 2; S. Mordwa, *Wyobrażenia przestrzeni miejskiej Łodzi*, „Kronika m. Łodzi” 1993, z. 2; B. Jałowicki, M.S. Szczepański, *Miasto i przestrzeń w perspektywie socjologicznej*, Warszawa 2006.

¹⁰ G. Węclawowicz, *Geografia behawioralna*, „Przegląd Zagranicznej Literatury Geograficznej” 1986, z. 3-4.

¹¹ A. Foland, *Psychokartografia w praktyce. Badania psychologicznych właściwości przestrzeni*, <http://www.psychokartografia.foland.pl/pierwsze.pdf> (dostęp 14.02.2022).

¹² M. Bieniek-Ciarcńska, *Wykorzystanie profilowania...*, niepublikowana rozprawa doktorska, Warszawa 2020. Analizowano dane pozyskane m.in. z Komendy Głównej Policji w Warszawie, Komendy Stołecznej Policji, komend rejonowych policji w Warszawie, komend wojewódzkich.

Regulation No. 768. According to § 2(12), a patrol assignment is “a graphical and descriptive document used to improve the organization of patrol service, containing the characteristics of danger areas, patrol routes, danger spots, areas of responsibility and a collection of basic information used in the course of service”.¹³ This document shall be developed for the area of operation of the municipal, district or regional Police headquarters and, where appropriate, also for the area of specific Police precincts.¹⁴ Importantly, patrol assignments are internal documents of the Police and are classified, non-public in nature. This is due to the fact that they contain a range of information obtained directly as a result of operational and reconnaissance work, the publication of which would compromise the actions taken by officers in the field.¹⁵ It is therefore essential that data obtained in this way is protected, in particular by eliminating unauthorised access to it.

Information obtained through the National Police Headquarters shows that, in practice, the Police Threat Map is not strictly identified as a graphic document. Rather, it is made of tabular and descriptive statements¹⁶ forming part of the Analysis of the State of Security and Order for the deployment of the patrol service [*Analiza Stanu Bezpieczeństwa i Porządku*] (ASBIP). The spectrum of data included in the document covers incidents revealed during patrol duty in a given area, hence each unit is characterised by a different number of incidents. The most frequently recorded incidents include: fights and beatings, robbery and extortion, bodily harm, theft of property, burglary, destruction of property, and theft of vehicles.¹⁷ The amount of data collected varies depending on the characteristics of the area, and on the activities undertaken by the officers. Also situational factors have an impact there.

Due to the lack of dedicated software and adequate technical facilities to visualise data on vector maps, the presentation of data is made in the form of

¹³ § 2 pkt 12 zarządzenia nr 768. Na poczet niniejszego opracowania warto przytoczyć wyjaśnienia pojęć zawartych we wskazanej definicji. Zgodnie z § 2 zarządzenia nr 768: „⁴) rejon zagrożenia - określony obszar terenu, charakteryzujący się szczególnym nasileniem przestępstw, wykroczeń lub występowaniem innych zjawisk patologii społecznej;

⁵) trasa patrolowa - odcinek drogi łączący rejony i miejsca zagrożone, ważniejsze obiekty, posterunki lub inne punkty i miejsca wynikające z bieżących potrzeb służby;

⁶) miejsce zagrożone - obiekt lub niewielki obszar, które według aktualnego rozpoznania, wymagają systematycznego nadzoru i kontroli policyjnej ze względu na występowanie przestępstw, wykroczeń lub innych zjawisk patologii społecznej;

⁷) rejon odpowiedzialności - obszar wyznaczony w oparciu o rejony zagrożenia, miejsca zagrożone, rejony służbowe dzielnicowych oraz inne wskazane rejony, w którym w miarę możliwości służbę pełnią ci sami policjanci, którzy odpowiadają za stan bezpieczeństwa na tym obszarze”.

¹⁴ § 1 ust. 3 zarządzenia nr 768: „Przepisy zarządzenia dotyczące komendanta powiatowego Policji i komendy powiatowej Policji stosuje się odpowiednio do komendanta miejskiego Policji i komendy miejskiej Policji oraz komendanta rejonowego Policji i komendy rejonowej Policji”.

¹⁵ Szczegółowe zadania wykonywane w trakcie służby przez komórki interwencyjne, wywiadowcze czy patrolowe bez umundurowania zostały wskazane w § 17, 19, 29-37 zarządzenia nr 768.

¹⁶ Pismo KGP w Warszawie z 10 lipca 2017 r., sygn. Gip-2966/17, [za:] M. Bieniek- Ciarcińska, *Wykorzystanie profilowania...*, s. 377.

¹⁷ M. Bieniek-Ciarcińska, *Wykorzystanie profilowania...*, s. 377.

graphs and tables. Often, information on risk areas is also simply plotted on publicly available city plans hung on cork boards in the briefing rooms for presentation to officers on patrol duty and/or doing their rounds on a given day. What's important, patrol assignments are developed separately for foot and motorised patrols based on the specifics of their work.

However, regardless of this distinction, a patrol assignment is split into two parts – a fixed and an interchangeable part. The first one, as a rule, contains invariable elements, such as “the designation of the document; a graphic sketch of the area with marked objects subject to mandatory protection, fixed posts, checkpoints, the patrolling route; a list of basic legal acts regulating the use of firearms, means of direct coercion and the powers of a Police officer; data concerning the maintenance of radio communication; a list of contact details of the most important institutions as well as information on the neighbourhood officer serving the area”.¹⁸ Nonetheless, this part will also be modified, for example if the details of the institutions are updated or if the legal acts are amended. Hence, their periodic review is required. Generally speaking, this part may be characterised as a set of important information, essential for officers on patrol. These items also provide a form of guidance for officers regarding the rules in force during the performance of their duties, as well as indications regarding the topography of the patrolled area and the strategic places located in its area, for which protection is mandatory.

The interchangeable part, characterised by the variability of data contained therein, in principle consists of “a list of places and areas at risk, taking into account the time and type of threats occurring; ad hoc tasks to serve, e.g. resulting from ongoing programmes, actions, operations; a list of persons wanted on an emergency basis, together with photographic documentation, and other relevant data necessary for the proper execution of the unit's tasks”.¹⁹ The data in this section, as it relates directly to the existing risks in the area for which the patrol assignment was created, needs to be continuously updated. Also included among the data are all the activities carried out during the period and ad hoc tasks arising from the assignment context, including in particular those related to temporary potential threats. These include, for example, countering terrorist acts in places that are particularly vulnerable to such events (e.g. football arenas during matches); ensuring security on public transport (including countering pickpocketing, monitoring bus/tram stops); prevention of so-called street selling (control of vendors displaying goods on street pavements); thematic actions and campaigns, e.g. “Stop Begging”, “The Homeless” (control of areas where the homeless are staying, especially in the autumn and winter period²⁰), “Banks” (monitoring of

¹⁸ § 22 pkt 3 ppkt 1, lit. a-f zarządzenia nr 768.

¹⁹ § 22 pkt 3 ppkt 2, lit. a-d zarządzenia nr 768.

²⁰ Do takich obszarów zalicza się klatki schodowe, kanały ciepłownicze, ogródki działkowe, opuszczone

places where ATMs are located; monitoring of bank outlets also by means of video surveillance), "NURD", i.e. the action aimed at the protection of unprotected road traffic participants (mainly checking whether bicycle riders are equipped with and use reflective elements after dark), "Safe Cyclist", "Mobile phone", "I don't drive after alcohol", "Safe holidays" or "Reduce speeding".

Monitoring of places identified as places at risk is aimed at acquiring any information, which, if used appropriately, may contribute to the identification of the perpetrator of crime or, at an earlier stage, to the prevention of the occurrence of criminal activity in the specified area.

Previous scientific research, which collected the data reflected in patrol assignments in the areas of operation of police patrols in Warsaw, resulted in documents described as patrol guidelines for officers.²¹ These contained daily information on the incidents recorded and the identified sites at risk. In addition, information was recorded on the execution of tasks in response to any irregularities. Through these activities, certain persistent risks were identified, most notably vandalism, theft, burglary of residential and business premises, as well as traffic-related crimes and offences. The activities also identified risks of arson, prostitution as well as terrorist threats, primarily due to a large number of facilities of tactical nature, such as bridges, embassies, metro stations, shopping malls. Attention was also drawn to the possibility of armed robbery (sites such as betting shops and Lotto outlets were identified as places where the risk of becoming a victim is higher).

As already mentioned, the activities of an operational nature listed in patrol assignments cannot be disclosed to the public. Otherwise, the analyses performed might not provide tangible benefits to law enforcement services in terms of ongoing activities, if the information about such activities was available to the wider public, since it should be remembered that this group includes also potential perpetrators. Thanks to a systematic analysis of the state of security and order, the deployment of patrol services is more organised, as the number of officers dispatched to a given location can be directly proportional to the threats existing in the area.

1.2. The National Security Threat Map in Poland

In contrast to internal threat maps, the National Security Threat Map in Poland (hereinafter: KMZB) is a nationwide ICT tool (application) which also serves the function of patrol assignments, however, unlike them, it is universally accessible and at the same time puts emphasis on citizen participation and involvement in the process of reporting undesirable events. The public, when given the opportunity

miejsca tzw. *squaty*.

²¹ M. Bieniek-Ciarcńska, *Wykorzystanie profilowania...*, s. 390 i n.

to file reports of behaviours which are against the law and applicable norms according to their subjective perception, contributes significantly to the production of reports, which are then verified by authorised officers. In this context, the tasks of police officers consist of verifying reports rather than personally identifying places at risk.

The national implementation of the KMZB took place on 5 October 2016.²² Prior to the launch of the application, public consultations were held, resulting in a nationwide information campaign.²³ More than 217,000 people took part in the consultations, which was a clear indication of the momentum with which, for the first time ever, the Police consulted citizens on the subject of security, making the public an equal partner in discussions on the shape of measures to be taken to improve it. In the course of these consultations the comments, viewpoints, opinions or suggestions collected were subject to a process of in-depth analysis.

It should be noted that the KMZB was not the first project of its kind in the country. Previously, a project which used Google Earth map resources was implemented by the company SmartEnough with the support of the Voivode of Śląskie Province.²⁴ The data from the Provincial Police Headquarters in Katowice, recorded in the Electronic Duty Service Book [*Elektroniczna Książka Służby Dyżurnego*] (EKSD), was 'superimposed' on the map of the city by employees of the Department of Forensic Science at the University of Silesia. In this way, it was possible to identify the areas with the highest recorded crime rates in the analysed period. The university collected information in a specially created database, which reached 325,000 records in 2010, after which, due to a lack of adequate financial

²² Pismo Komendanta Głównego Policji (znak: L.dz. EP-226/16) z 20 stycznia 2016 r. do podległych jednostek w kraju zawierało 2 załączniki. Pierwszym z dniach były Założenia Krajowej Mapy Zagrożeń Bezpieczeństwa w Polsce, drugim zaś mapy wraz z opisem, [za:] M. Bieniek-Ciarcińska, *Wykorzystanie profilowania...*, s. 395.

²³ „W pierwszym tygodniu prowadzonych konsultacji, w dniach 1-5 lutego odbyło się 8 takich spotkań na poziomie powiatowym oraz 27 na poziomie lokalnym. Wzięło w nich udział odpowiednio ponad 240 i blisko 560 osób. Podczas drugiego tygodnia spotkań w dniach 8-12 lutego - na poziomie powiatowym i lokalnym policjanci przeprowadzili łącznie 70 konsultacji społecznych, w których uczestniczyło 1649 osób. W kolejnym tygodniu w dniach 15-20 lutego na poziomie powiatowym i lokalnym przeprowadzono łącznie 74 konsultacje społeczne (12 na poziomie powiatowym, 62 na poziomie lokalnym), w których uczestniczyło łącznie 1706 osób (341 na poziomie powiatowym, 1365 na poziomie lokalnym). W ostatnim tygodniu konsultacji w okresie 22-26 lutego na poziomie powiatowym i lokalnym przeprowadzono łącznie 81 konsultacji społecznych (10 na poziomie powiatowym, 71 na poziomie lokalnym), w których łącznie uczestniczyło 1725 osób (233 na poziomie powiatowym i 1492 na poziomie lokalnym). Spotkania cieszyły się dużym zainteresowaniem. Szczególnie wśród mieszkańców małych społeczności, którzy zadawali dużo pytań i dziękowali za to, że w rejonach wiejskich bardzo często widać patrole prewencyjne i ruchu drogowego. Jak wyglądały spotkania i konsultacje w poszczególnych powiatach można zobaczyć i przeczytać na stronach internetowych Komend Powiatowych Policji garnizonu warmińsko- mazurskiej policji”, [za:] KWP w Szczecinie, <http://www.warmińsko-mazurska.policja.gov.pl/ol/aktualnosci/18796,KWP-Zakonczyly-sie-konsultacje-spoleczne-w-sprawie-projektu-mapy-zagrozen-bezpie.html> (dostęp: 8.03.2016); M. Bieniek-Ciarcińska, *Wykorzystanie profilowania...*, s. 398.

²⁴ M. Bieniek-Ciarcińska, *Wykorzystanie profilowania...*, s. 394.

support, further project activities were discontinued.²⁵

Moving on to a detailed analysis of the KMZB tool, it is important to point out its several essential features. The first is the holistic approach to data collection, reflected in the tool's country-wide scope. In fact, the KMZB includes a breakdown into administrative areas at several levels (national level with a breakdown into provinces; provincial level with a breakdown into districts and cities with district rights; district level with a breakdown into city, district and regional Police headquarters, Police precincts and stations. Data regarding incidents recorded with respect to road traffic is also collected with a breakdown by municipality). Information covering the entire country is mapped and the division into the indicated levels is designed to contribute to better organisation, also with a view to appropriate grouping of the information obtained.

Another attribute is quantifiability, reflected in statistical reporting. The data collected in the National Police Information System [*Krajowy System Informacyjny Policji*] (KSIP) in the area of crime, the Police Electronic Reporting System [*System Elektronicznej Sprawozdawczości w Policji*] (SESPol) and the Register of Offence Cases [*Rejestr Spraw o Wykroczenia*] (RSOW) in the area of the threat of offences, in the area of threats to road safety (SEWIK), as well as those originating from citizen reports (direct or via neighbourhood officers) are plotted on local threat maps which, combined together, form the KMZB. These data are broken down both by territorial levels (province, district, municipality) and also by the way they were calculated and acquired (data per 10,000 inhabitants, social surveys, data expressed in absolute numbers, diagnosis).²⁶

At the initial stage of KMZB development, the use of ArcGIS and GeoMedia software was proposed. Finally, however, it was decided that using the free QGIS software would be the most appropriate for this purpose. The tool has been divided into the statistical part (data from police statistics) and the interactive part that uses resources which fall under the jurisdiction of the Surveyor General of Poland (i.e. MAPA TOPO I, MAPA ORTO, MAPA TOPO II).

In addition to the crime mapping function (reflecting graphically on maps the threats occurring in the areas concerned), the KMZB also aimed at combining this knowledge with the implementation of special signs and status coding. The latter are additionally colour-coded ("new" notification - green, "verification" - yellow, "confirmed" - red, "confirmed - transferred outside the police" - purple, "confirmed - eliminated" - blue, "unconfirmed" - grey).

The purpose of the use of status symbols and codes, which are explained in the application's 'Legend', was to provide clarity, which cannot be achieved otherwise than through the use of symbolic signs accompanied by an appropriate description.


²⁵ *Mapy przestępczości*, „Geodeta” 2008, nr 9, s. 160.

²⁶ Szczegółowe opracowanie danych uzyskanych na podstawie informacji uzyskanych z KGP oraz 16 KWP, [za:] M. Bieniek-Ciarcńska, *Wykorzystanie profilowania...*, s. 396-397.

Only in this way could the proposed exchange of information between the public and the relevant services be free of elements that would confuse or mislead users. The reports themselves, in turn, were treated as 'tasks assigned' to the Police so that appropriate action could be taken.

Among the 27 graphic symbols there are the following categories of incidents (crimes, offenses):

Graphic symbols used in the KMZB in Poland.²⁷



The introduction of the KMZB was also associated with assigning new tasks and responsibilities to officers. Attention should be drawn to Guidelines No. 3,²⁸ already amended twice, which deal with this matter in detail, with the decisions on the appointment of competent coordinators, both officers and civilian employees (at local, provincial and national level), as well as the issues of supervising the execution of tasks assigned to each unit being made on the basis of a resolution of the competent provincial Chief of Police.

The tasks of these coordinators with a breakdown into levels can be found in

²⁷ Krajowa Mapa Zagrożeń Bezpieczeństwa, zakładka Legenda, <https://mapy.geoportal.gov.pl/iMapLite/KMZBPublic.html> (dostęp: 14.09.2021).

²⁸ Wytyczne nr 3 Komendanta Głównego Policji z dnia 14 września 2016 r. w sprawie sposobu postępowania policjantów podczas realizacji zadań związanych z funkcjonowaniem Krajowej Mapy Zagrożeń Bezpieczeństwa (Dz. Urz. z 2016 r. poz. 58; dalej: wytyczne nr 3 z 2016 r.); wytyczne nr 1 Komendanta Głównego Policji z dnia 31 lipca 2017 r. zmieniające wytyczne w sprawie sposobu postępowania policjantów podczas realizacji zadań związanych z funkcjonowaniem Krajowej Mapy Zagrożeń Bezpieczeństwa (Dz. Urz. KGP poz. 53); wytyczne nr 3 Komendanta Głównego Policji z dnia 20 grudnia 2019 r. zmieniające wytyczne w sprawie sposobu postępowania policjantów podczas realizacji zadań związanych z funkcjonowaniem Krajowej Mapy Zagrożeń Bezpieczeństwa (Dz. Urz. KGP poz. 122).

§4(1)-(3).²⁹ This hierarchy is not coincidental, as officers verify the performance of levels reporting to them (the provincial level is responsible for keeping records of local coordinators, monitors the tasks performed by them and carries out training for them while the national level, respectively, keeps records of provincial coordinators and undertakes training activities for them). The lowest level, which deals directly with local incidents, is responsible for “reviewing the ‘New’ threats plotted on the ‘Threat Map’, ongoing monitoring of the timely verification of threats and changing threat status on the ‘Threat Map’, collecting threat verification cards and supervising their circulation”.

Each level provides others with comments and requests on the functioning of the KMZB, while the national level is responsible for taking action to improve the functionality of the tool, doing this also by processing information received directly in email inbox: kmzb@policja.gov.pl.

With the first revision of the guidelines in 2017, additional responsibilities have been assigned to the Head of the organisational unit of the National Police Headquarters responsible for communications and IT, who is “responsible for quarterly updating the ‘Threat Map’ with statistical data received from the Heads of the following organisational units of the National Police Headquarters: the Cabinet of the Chief Police Commissioner, the Prevention Bureau, the Road Traffic Bureau and the Criminal Intelligence and Information Bureau”.³⁰

The tasks, although directly related to the development of a new source of information about threats (i.e. the KMZB), did not, in principle, result in the establishment of new organisational structures for their implementation in the police units. However, a dedicated support tool has been developed in the form of a one-page form for recording the most important information (the Threat Verification Card [*Karta Weryfikacji Zagrożenia*]; hereafter: KWZ).³¹

Thanks to KWZ it is possible to collect data about every incident, starting with the identification of the personal details of the person drawing up the Card, along with the category of the incident, the place where it occurred and the relevant dates, i.e. the date when it was drawn up as well as modified; the date when the threat or threats were plotted on the map; and the date when the status of the notification was changed. The document also records the distribution of tasks, lead times to completion, days of the week. Moreover, it features control tools in the form of annotations on the effects of task execution, along with the attribution of relevant statuses.

In terms of procedure, the confirmation of a threat is aimed at eliminating it,³²

²⁹ § 4 ust. 1-3 wytycznych nr 3 z 2016 r.

³⁰ § 4a wytycznych nr 1.

³¹ Stanowi ona załącznik do wytycznych nr 3 Komendanta Głównego Policji z dnia 20 grudnia 2019 r. zmieniające wytyczne w sprawie sposobu postępowania policjantów podczas realizacji zadań związanych z funkcjonowaniem Krajowej Mapy Zagrożeń Bezpieczeństwa, Dz. Urz. KGP poz. 122.

³² § 10 ust. 2 wytycznych nr 3.

which, according to Guidelines No. 3, is described as “a set of actions carried out by police officers leading to the elimination of a confirmed threat plotted on the ‘Threat Map’”.³³ The elimination of a threat from a technical point of view means that it is removed from the map, but does not prevent another subsequent threat from being applied, even if it is of the same nature as the previous one. In such case, the procedure is applied anew, including the filling in of a new KWZ.³⁴ In addition, in a situation where an event can be classified as a prank or mistake on the part of the reporting person, e.g. because an event such as an illegal car rally is marked by the reporting person in the middle of a lake, which, due to the topography of the area, makes it impossible to consider the information reliable, the local coordinator, in addition to changing the status to the specially marked category “Prank or mistake”, may also decide not to draw up a KWZ.³⁵

2. The public at the service of law and order

Collaboration between the Police and local communities was the foundation for the guidelines on the implementation of the KMZB.³⁶ Importantly, from the very beginning, the Police placed emphasis on public debate and already mentioned extensive consultations with organisations and institutions from all over the country. Among them were representatives of local authorities as well as the local media. The campaign included information posted on websites or social media. Posters and leaflets placed in public transport and public offices were also used. Neighbourhood officers presented the most important information at meetings with residents. Television and radio spots were used. Churches were also involved in the promotional campaign for the tool – relevant information was displayed on parish noticeboards and provided in the form of announcements from the pulpit.³⁷

All these parties were involved in the campaign so that knowledge could be gained on aspects relevant to them, in particular on their perception of the space as an area ‘burdened’ to varying degrees by undesirable behaviour. Their involvement was also intended to stimulate interest in the community, thereby promoting the project. Hence, the tangible result of the introduction of the KMZB, access to which was intended to be universal, was to be a social change manifesting itself in the fact that a greater percentage of people than before would adopt an

³³ § 2 pkt 8 wytycznych nr 3.

³⁴ Wytyczne nr 3 przewidują jednak pewien wyjątek od tej zasady zapisany w § 10 pkt 3: „W przypadku naniesienia na Mapę zagrożeń, w bliskiej odległości, kolejnych zagrożeń tej samej kategorii, które uprzednio posiadały status «Potwierdzone», lub «Potwierdzone (przekazane poza Policję)» koordynator lokalny sporządza kartę weryfikacji zagrożenia wypełniając wyłącznie pkt 1-5 oraz 18 lub 19 formularza karty”.

³⁵ § 12 pkt 1-2 wytycznych nr 3.

³⁶ Pismo KGP w Warszawie z 10 lipca 2017 r., sygn. Gip-2966/17.

³⁷ Szczegółowe dane uzyskane za pośrednictwem KWP w Łodzi 12 lipca 2017 r. (za pośrednictwem Wydziału Komunikacji Społecznej, nie wskazano sygnatury).

active civic attitude in caring for order in public spaces. The information obtained in this way, in addition to the data collected by the police units, was to be reflected in the analyses of the state of security.

The KMZB was therefore not only intended to identify threats (their number, type) but, above all, to influence an increased sense of security among the residents themselves. Intentions of the Police were quite simple: in addition to trying to assess events on the basis of the data collected, they hoped to improve the management of police resources by deploying officers to locations previously marked by citizens as hazardous in some way. The aim was to create a positive image of police officers so as to, on the one hand, improve the perception of their work in the eyes of local residents and, on the other hand, to increase the sense of security, both on a subjective (individual) and an objective (national) level. Another objective was to ensure that it would be possible to verify “survey results concerning citizens’ sense of security, published by opinion polling centres, against prior analyses or the Police’s own data”.³⁸

As an aside, it should be pointed out that the KMZB itself was never intended to remain the exclusive source of information on criminal incidents, offences and other violations affecting the citizens’ sense of security. The primary source of data continues to be the operational work of officers, only followed by data obtained using other sources, e.g. the KMZB. However, it has become an additional source of information about security threats.

An unobvious result of the launch of the KMZB was a new category: “Begging and Homelessness”. Marking points on the map that refer explicitly to these social phenomena could indicate that they are related to reports of civic concern rather than crime or offences committed by homeless people and/or those involved in begging. They are more a social nuisance than a real threat to the sense of security. Nevertheless, this category has emerged as a marker for the threat to the life or health of vulnerable people in a difficult material and living situation. Indeed, over time, users began to use the KMZB to reach out to those in need. The application has therefore contributed not so much to the reduction of the subjective sense of threat in this case as to the need to encourage empathy among citizens.³⁹ Although no reports were noted as to the need for changes in terms of renaming the category “Homelessness”, its designation was modified to “Homeless person in need of assistance”. This clarified what actions were taken when this category was

³⁸ Pismo KWP w Gdańsku z 7 lipca 2017 r., sygn. Ldz. P.062-85/2017.

³⁹ Z informacji Komendy Głównej Policji wynika, że „Użytkownicy wykorzystują te kategorie celem udzielenia pomocy osobom jej potrzebującym”. Dodatkowo wskazano „działania Policji wobec takich osób, ukierunkowane są głównie na udzielenie im możliwie wszechstronnej pomocy, a nie stosowanie represji. W samej kategorii *Bezdomność* odnotowaliśmy ponad 12 tys. zgłoszeń. W wyniku potwierdzenia występowania zjawiska w blisko 4,5 tys. przypadków, Policja podjęła różnego rodzaju działania pomocowe (...)”, [za:] pismo Zastępcy Komendanta Głównego Policji z 24 września 2019 r., znak: EP-4737/3954/19 do Rzecznika Praw Obywatelskich.

reported.

As a complementary note, it should be pointed out that although the KMZB also has its statistical dimension, it is impossible to predict how many security threats will be mapped on any given day. This depends partly on the activity of citizens, but importantly, if an area has been adequately protected against undesirable behaviour, e.g. by frequent police patrols in a specific area, it may not generate information about unlawful acts at the same time. However, this statement is a kind of simplification, which will be criticised later in this article.

Behaviours reported by citizens that they subjectively perceive to be a public nuisance may, moreover, be neither offences nor crimes under the current legislation. It should also be noted that making a report is not “equivalent to reporting a crime or an offence, but is merely a way of signalling a perceived problem”.⁴⁰

Importantly, though, despite the widespread access to the Internet, on which the application is based, reports can also be made by telephone (emergency number 997 or 112) or through neighbourhood officers because not everyone is an Internet user. Reasons may vary (lack of access to the network itself; lack of computer equipment; lack of or limited/inadequate skills; lack of confidence in modern technology; awareness of not remaining anonymous online, etc.).

3. Evaluation of the functioning of the National Security Threat Map

For the first time the KMZB was subject to evaluation in January/February 2017 as part of the 10th edition of the Polish Crime Survey.⁴¹ According to 58.8% of respondents, this tool has the potential to “contribute to a decrease in the number of particularly socially troublesome crimes/offences”.⁴²

An additional survey on the performance of the KMZB was conducted between 24 January and 3 March 2017, with 3,433 respondents.⁴³ Overall, the KMZB was evaluated as a tool of positive importance for society (57.9%). Only one in six respondents assessed the application negatively (16.8%), while ¼ of respondents (25.4%) chose the answer ‘hard to say’.


⁴⁰ Pismo KWP z/s w Radomiu z 3 lipca 2017 r., sygn. L.dz WKS-2953/2592/17; pismo KWP w Gorzowie Wielkopolskim z 5 lipca 2017 r., sygn. WKS-580/2017; pismo KWP w Bydgoszczy z 28 lipca 2017 r., sygn. WKS-SO.062.63.1.2017.JN.

⁴¹ *Ocena Policji, poczucie bezpieczeństwa PBP 2007-2017*, PDF, <http://bip.kgp.policja.gov.pl/kgp/rejestr/25207,dok.html> (dostęp: 16.02.2018).

⁴² Zgodnie z informacjami uzyskanymi z KGP, KSP oraz 16-tu KWP.

⁴³ Pismo KGP w Warszawie z 10 lipca 2017 r., sygn. Gip-2966/17; Gip-2966/17; M. Głodziński, A. Kłys - Zespół ds. Analiz i Kontroli Zarządczej Gabinetu KGP, *Krajowa Mapa Zagrożeń Bezpieczeństwa, „Policja”*, Wydanie specjalne nr 9, kwiecień 2017 r., s. 3-51.

Evaluation of the KMZB.




Own compilation⁴⁴.

Respondents in the survey also provided evaluation of the impact of the KMZB application on public security situation. The results are shown in the graphs below.

⁴⁴ M. Bieniek-Ciarcńska, *Wykorzystanie profilowania...*, s. 424.

Impact of the KMZB on security



Own compilation based on: M. Głodziński, A. Kłys, *Krajowa Mapa...*, ISSN 2391-4335, p.

In each of the three categories (i.e. improving the effectiveness of police operations; contributing to a decrease in crimes/offences of particular public nuisance; increasing citizens' sense of security), the majority of respondents (59.4%, 55% and 54.2%, respectively) agreed with the statement.

Information obtained through the Provincial Police Headquarters in Łódź shows that the implementation of the KMZB has contributed to a number of changes, e.g.: "in case of inadequate/inappropriate road markings/traffic signs, illegal parking (besides the officers' reaction to reported hazards) motions are addressed by the Police to the relevant actors, e.g. security commissions, city halls, district administration and others; this eliminates these threats in the future (e.g. by reorganisation of traffic, increased number of parking spaces, etc.); with regard to illegal rubbish dumps, neighbourhood officers, after establishing who owns the site, enforce its removal and block access; in case of speeding more traffic patrols

are deployed to the area indicated in the map, and the inspections carried out make a significant contribution to minimising this phenomenon. Similarly, when residents in the area indicate places where alcohol or drugs are consumed then, in the unit's opinion considerable force of foot patrols is deployed there and activities organised help to reduce this threat".⁴⁵

In the course of scientific research carried out with regard to the possible impact of the KMZB on changes in the image of crime of a given type, it was found, inter alia, that the Prevention Department of the Provincial Police Headquarters in Poznań recorded the highest number of confirmed reports on the use of narcotic drugs within its local jurisdiction, which led to the elimination of this problem in a specific area.⁴⁶ In the case of the Provincial Police Headquarters in Szczecin, reports of offences such as drinking in prohibited places or vandalism resulted in more appropriate deployment of police officers and their more effective work.⁴⁷ The Provincial Police Headquarters in Olsztyn emphasized the fact that once a threat had been identified in the area, it did not occur again.⁴⁸ However, there is a problem with interpretation of the collected data, because when a problem has been eliminated in a specific area, one cannot be sure that crime of a particular type has not simply moved to another location. Therefore it is not possible to identify clear success of the KMZB in this respect.

4. Future of the KMZB – summary of analyses and final conclusions

Despite previous attempts to bring communities closer to the work of officers in the area, it is only the KMZB that has become known as a new, innovative, fully interactive application that aims to protect the security of local communities. By generating interest among residents, which also resulted in a positive response to the public consultations, the KMZB is perceived as an opportunity to bring under supervision the areas important from the viewpoint of citizens themselves.

In addition, the application has stimulated public participation in the decision-making process with regard to improving security, including the possible locations of police stations. This especially applies to the decision-makers' consideration of the possibility of reinstating stations previously closed down,⁴⁹ taking into account the existing risks in previously unprotected or insufficiently protected areas.

The aforementioned activities, characteristic of civil societies, promote a model of shared responsibility for the security of local communities. Hence, they have also

⁴⁵ Pismo KWP w Łodzi z 12 lipca 2017 r. (za pośrednictwem Wydziału Komunikacji Społecznej), nie wskazano sygnatury, [za:] M. Bieniek-Ciarcińska, *Wykorzystanie profilowania...*, s. 427.

⁴⁶ Pismo KWP w Poznaniu z 5 lipca 2017 r., sygn. P-Kw-MR-062/5/17 (Wydział Prewencji).

⁴⁷ Pismo KWP w Szczecinie z 4 lipca 2017 r., sygn. IK-VII-610/17 (Wydział Kontroli).

⁴⁸ Także KWP w Białymstoku (pismo KWP w Białymstoku z 6 lipca 2017 r., sygn. P.062.62.2017.MB).

⁴⁹ Krajowa Mapa Zagrożeń Bezpieczeństwa, <https://www.gov.pl/web/mswia/krajowa-mapazagrozen-bezpieczenstwa> (dostęp: 1.09.2021).

resulted in an increased level of social control.⁵⁰ Importantly, by familiarising residents with the type of threats and the public institutions responsible for their elimination, these activities ultimately led to the creation of a channel for the flow of information between the public and the relevant actors, with the Police at the forefront, specifically by enabling public participation in the development of safe spaces.⁵¹ It is pointed out that “in this context, the ‘Threat Map’ is regarded as an essential element of the public safety management process, implemented in inter-institutional and social partnership”.⁵² At the same time, it contributes to improving the image of officers, who were not perceived by some members of the public as partners but merely enforcers of the rules and norms in force in the area (this mainly concerns the neighbourhood policeman, whose role as an officer present in the community was sought to be emphasised in a special way).

The KMZB was intended to reflect the actual state of events⁵³ in terms of crime revealed, in order to show the public the scale of the problem and at the same time to indicate that it was thanks to citizen activism that certain incidents were identified and qualified as relevant to both parties – citizens and officers. In this way, preventive measures could be introduced.

An aspect in favour of the KMZB was also its public accessibility, which made it possible for citizens to monitor areas within their spectrum of interest on an ongoing basis. Ease of operation via a mobile application (‘GeoportalMobile’)⁵⁴ and via a website service www.policja.pl, as well as assurance of complete anonymity (although an informed user may be concerned about the IP record of the device/network) were additional factors to help improve contact between residents and officers. These objectives have been achieved.

The analysed tool also has its weaknesses. The KMZB, unlike the threat maps included in Regulation No. 768 (which are characterised by the fact of being produced as a result of the operational and investigative work of officers), is

⁵⁰ Pismo KWP w Szczecinie z 4 lipca 2017 r., sygn. IK-VII-610/17.

⁵¹ Obywatele powinni jednak pamiętać, iż zgłoszenia mające charakter pilny, zagrażające bezpośrednio życiu lub zdrowiu powinny być zgłaszane niezwłocznie w odpowiedniej formie, tj. poprzez kontakt telefoniczny wybierając numer alarmowy 112 lub 997.

⁵² Pismo KWP w Olsztynie z 20 lipca 2017 r. (nie wskazano sygnatury), [za:] M. Bieniek- Ciarczińska, *Wykorzystanie profilowania...*, s. 401.

⁵³ M. Jureczka, *Mapy zagrożeń jako nowa forma działania na rzecz wspomagania bezpieczeństwa społecznego*, „Zeszyty Naukowe Ruchu Studenckiego” 2016, nr 1, s. 10.

⁵⁴ Na marginesie wskazać należy, że sama aplikacja z perspektywy użytkownika jest obsługiwana intuicyjnie. Umożliwia za pomocą usług lokalizacji ustalenie położenia osoby zgłaszającej, a także na dokonanie pomiarów (odległości dwóch obiektów od siebie, bądź wydzielenia obszaru). Przybliżanie i oddalanie obszarów funkcjonują bez zarzutów, podobnie jak szybkość aplikacji, którą należy ocenić pozytywnie. Co do zasady aplikacja nie zawiera elementów wprowadzających w błąd, trudnością jednak pozostaje powrót do menu głównego i zamknięcie okna - po zamknięciu aplikacji w sposób tradycyjny (wyjście z panelu) użytkownik wraca w miejsce, w którym uprzednio zakończył korzystanie z niej. Co prawda istnieje możliwość dokonania przesunięcia treści palcem/rysikiem z lewej do prawej strony, jednakże dla mniej zaawansowanych użytkowników smartfonów może być to utrudnienie, które powinno zostać niezwłocznie wyeliminowane. Użytkownicy starszych aparatów telefonicznych nie będą mogli skorzystać z aplikacji.

a typical tool for public use, of a subjective nature, which does not contain quantifiable information about crime in a given area. Crime, as a social phenomenon, is characterised by its dynamic nature, which means that the data on the maps must be constantly updated. In the case of the KMZB, there is a high likelihood that the data posted on the Map result in the transfer of undesirable events to other areas, rather than their elimination.

In addition, although the authors of the tool have clearly stated the purpose of the KMZB, some of the information from citizens does not contribute to improving security in the area, as the tool can be used as a prank, e.g. by providing information about an unguarded level crossing at the top of a mountain (hence the creation of the additional status "Prank or mistake"). It has also been observed that non-existent threats are reported in order to cause more officers to be deployed to a particular location, which directly translates into understaffing in other patrolled areas. Due to the fact that the reliability and validity of the data entered depend to a large extent on the users themselves, the actual assessment of the tool in terms of its functional performance, and thus also its assumed effectiveness, is difficult.

In view of the arguments presented above (both those clearly positive and those that somehow question the effectiveness of the KMZB), the subject matter should also include some conclusions and proposals that may in the future contribute to the verification of the effectiveness of the tool by its authors, as well as to its modification with new components or elimination of the identified deficiencies. Indeed, it should be pointed out that every interactive tool, embedded in a certain virtual space, requires adequate technical improvements, the lack of which may hinder or prevent its further functioning.

Having in mind the need to keep up with new technical solutions, it is reasonable to invest in the KMZB, as well as other such instruments for combating and preventing crime, but only under the assumption that relevant analyses are carried out at the same time (testing supported by collecting the opinions of users, both citizens and the officers themselves who operate these instruments). Importantly, residents who have gained control over the content of the KMZB should also be notified of any changes, so that, while continuing in the partnership that contributed to the application, they can also make their views known during the modernisation stages. After all, not only technology is affected by the passing of time. It also leaves its mark on people and their perception of existing solutions. The world is changing and people change along with it. This also applies to the legislative process, with which both criminalisation and decriminalisation are closely linked.

It should therefore also be proposed that the guidelines for officers developed to date (by coordinators at the various levels) be evaluated on an ongoing basis and, following this, that consideration be given to possible amendments to the legal

basis underpinning the KMZB.⁵⁵ Statutory regulations and new trends in the zoning plans of the areas concerned, or urbanisation in general and the social phenomena associated with it, can lead to completely new conclusions from year to year. By looking at the KMZB in a holistic way, its developers and those working with them will be able to keep up with the changes. The first visible indication of the willingness to embrace change is the activation of the email box kmzb@policja.gov.pl and the encouragement for citizens to provide ongoing feedback on the functioning of the application.⁵⁶ Further significant improvements, which included the implementation of the KWZ in electronic form instead of the previously existing paper form, also included the release of a mobile version of the application so that it can also be used from mobile devices; or the addition of the possibility for other users to confirm an already posted security threat without having to apply it once again in the same place. Such actions, which demonstrate an openness towards the public, combined with a legislative initiative, can contribute to further changes in existing legislation. Positive prospects in this context place the KMZB in the field of activities undertaken to improve the state of security in local communities, although with varying degrees of success.

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⁵⁶ Pismo Zastępcy Komendanta Głównego Policji z 24 września 2019 r., znak: EP-4737/3954/19 do Rzecznika Praw Obywatelskich.

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